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Abstract 
Despite extensive debate on the influence of discourse on environmental politics, research 
has yet fully to reveal how discursive processes affect policy change on issues like climate 
change. Discourse-related approaches are also often criticised for critiquing current policy 
situations but paying limited attention to utilising communication studies to enable policy 
change. This article explores how narrative policy analysis – a linguistic technique for 
analysing policy issues where uncertainty and complexity have bred polarisation – can be 
utilised to recast disputes over climate policy in ways that facilitate compromise and policy 
change. As a focus, we examine disputes surrounding the New Zealand Emissions Trading 
Scheme, drawing on elite interviews and documentary analysis to analyse contrasting 
narratives about the scheme’s effectiveness in reducing greenhouse-gas emissions. The first 
portrays New Zealand as a trade-exposed country that makes only minor contributions to 
global emissions to defend cautious and low-cost policy. Its rival advocates stronger domestic 
action even if this entails higher costs. Mapping the contentions, assumptions and 
characterisations in these narratives, combined with analysis of recent policy developments, 
reveal important insights on how narrative policy analysis can be used to enhance 
understandings of policy change, particularly: the difficulties of attacking opponents’ 
‘anchoring narratives’; how analysing minor narratives and differences in narrative alliances 
can assist in overcoming barriers to policy change; how narrative changes and ‘narrative 
diplomacy’ prepare the ground for policy change; and the importance of examining issues 
neglected in polarised debates on climate policy.  
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Introduction 
The influence of discourse on political responses to environmental problems has long been 
debated by environmental politics scholars (Feindt and Oels, 2005). Dryzek (1997) and Hajer 
(1995), among others, first established the importance of discourse in environmental 
politics, but recent years has seen a wealth of studies examining linkages between discourse 
and policy change on issues such as climate change, energy policy, ozone-depleting 
substances, biodiversity and water pollution (Christoff, 2013; Eckersley, 2016; Gillard, 
2016a; 2016b; Gillard & Lock, 2017; Hovden & Lindseth, 2004; Kurki, Takala & Vinnari, 2016; 
Shin & Choi, 2014). In parallel, branches of the policy-change literature also have a rich 
pedigree of investigating how policy change is enacted through ideas and language, 
including work on value frames, actor coalitions, and actors’ construction of their interests 
(Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993; Pemberton & Oliver, 2004), issue streams (Kingdon, 1995), 
and iterations between policy stability and change (Hall, 1993; Bailey & Wilson, 2009).  
Despite the contributions of these works to understanding the relationship between 
discourse and policy change, Gillard (2016a) argues that many analyses still treat ideas and 
discourse as ancillary influences compared with power and interests, and only partially 
reveal how discursive processes alter institutional preferences and policy. Studies have 
utilised discursive institutionalism to explore how discourses affect actor strategies and 
normative alignments (Lorenzoni & Benson, 2014; Gillard, 2016a), but their authors still 
argue for greater attention to how ideas and discourse operate as distinctive forms of 
power. Another common criticism of discourse analysis is that they remain preoccupied with 
‘exposing ideological manipulation that shapes and perpetuates power imbalances through 
discourse’ and pay limited attention to how unequal power relations and unbalanced 
policies can be overcome (Breeze, 2011: 516). Whether prompted by methodological 
uncertainty or concerns about advocacy, this has muted discourse analysis as a 
transformative force in environmental politics, a difficult situation to justify given discourse 
analysis’ concern with challenging unjust power relations (Hajer, 1995) and the potential for 
discourse approaches to develop alternative ways of discussing and managing contentious 
environmental issues. 
One branch of linguistic analysis more forthcoming in this regard is Narrative Policy Analysis 
(NPA), a technique that applies literary theory to debates where complexity and uncertainty 
have created polarisation and hostile conditions for policy change (Hampton, 2009; Roe, 
1994). Like other linguistic approaches, it sees issue framing and communication as central to 
political debate (McBeth, Shanahan, Arnell & Hathaway, 2007). However, its emphasis on 
analysing narratives to identify ways of engineering political space to solve policy problems 
creates possibilities for using discourse-related approaches more actively to address 
environmental issues (Epstein, Farina & Heidt, 2014; Roe, 1994). 
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To elaborate, how policy issues are formulated usually follows a narrative structure involving: 
a beginning (current situations), a middle (issues associated with the problem), and an end 
(solutions); a plot (reasoning to defend preferred actions); and heroes, villains and victims 
(those championing or opposing certain narratives or affected by decisions) (Stone, 2002). 
The first step in NPA entails constructing the narrative currently dominating a topic to clarify 
its reasoning, values, assumptions, evidence and supporters (Jacobs & Sobieraj, 2007). The 
next identifies ‘counternarratives’ challenging the dominant narrative (Epstein, Farina & 
Heidt, 2014); the two are then compared to seek a new ‘meta-narrative’ as ‘a superordinate 
frame that joins two otherwise incommensurable positions’ (Bridgman & Barry, 2002: 142) 
and ‘underwrites and stabilizes the assumptions for decision making on an issue where 
current policy narratives are so conflicting as to paralyze decision making’ (Roe, 1994: 4). 
NPA has been applied to: climate adaptation (Paschen & Ison, 2014); landscape change 
(Thiha, Webb & Honda 2007); conservation (Lawton & Rudd, 2014); pesticides (Hirsch, Baxter 
& Brown, 2010); sustainable consumption (Berg & Hukkinen, 2011); transportation (van 
Eeten, 2006); public involvement in environmental decision-making (Hampton 2009); and 
fracking (Heikkila, Weible & Pierce, 2014). However, aside from Roe (1994) and Fløttum & 
Gjerstad (2017), NPA of climate mitigation policy remains sparse, despite long-running 
controversies over climate policy in many countries, and the challenges of meeting national 
emissions reduction commitments agreed under the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement. 
This article contributes to addressing these concerns by examining how NPA can assist in 
rendering controversial debates on climate policy more amenable to conventional policy-
making, both to help address political difficulties facing mitigation policy and to strengthen 
connections between the discourse and policy-change literatures. As a focus, we examine 
disputes surrounding the New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme (NZ ETS), an emissions 
pricing scheme introduced in 2008 as New Zealand’s primary mechanism for climate 
mitigation which has been criticised by some for failing to create meaningful emissions 
reductions but supported by others for offering low-cost and flexible ways of meeting New 
Zealand’s international mitigation targets (Bailey & Jackson Inderberg, 2016; Bertram & Terry, 
2010; Motu Economic and Public Policy Research, 2018; New Zealand Government, 2016; 
New Zealand Productivity Commission, 2018). 
In the following sections, we discuss linkages between NPA and policy change, and explain 
the NZ ETS and our research methods. We then explore two key narratives on the NZ ETS, the 
first arguing that New Zealand is making a fair contribution to global mitigation relative to its 
size and trade exposure through a policy geared towards cost-effective emissions reduction, 
and the second advocating greater action to reduce domestic emissions through reforms to, 
or replacement of, the ETS. Following this, we analyse opportunities for bridging divisions on 
climate policy in New Zealand before reflecting on the wider contribution of NPA to 
addressing obstacles to climate mitigation policy. 
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Policy Narratives and Policy Change 
Discourse and narrative approaches are both concerned with how issue framing reflects and 
constructs perceptions of environmental issues. However, whilst many discourse approaches 
emphasise macro-contexts, scrutinising meta-discourses like ecological modernisation 
(Dryzek, 1997; Hajer, 1995), NPA’s primary interest is ‘the more immediate effects of the use 
of language in political debate’ (Hermville, 2016: 238). Roe (1994) argues that this proximate 
approach provides key advantages in understanding and addressing the dynamics of 
disagreement in specific debates. The mechanisms through which narratives affect 
institutions and policy nevertheless merit further discussion, in particular how narrative 
construction influences power relations between ideas and actors, and the factors driving 
narrative and policy change. 
Turning first to narrative construction, most political narratives possess two main dimensions: 
storylines used to justify preferred policies and stories rebutting counter-narratives that 
might de-legitimate policy choices or political actors (Jacobs & Sobieraj, 2007). This 
underscores that although narratives are important policy-making variables, they express 
both ideas and interests, and that a key motivation for storytelling by policy-makers is to build 
alliances and undermine sources of opposition (Carstensen & Schmidt, 2016). Additionally, 
understanding the nature of conflicts in policy debates (which and whose ideas are being 
legitimated or alienated) aids in identifying narratives for reducing polarisation (Hermwille, 
2016). The connection between narratives and the evidential ‘truth’ is questionable within 
any debate (Roe, 1994), but a narrative must be seen as legitimate by influential actors to 
gain influence (Czarniawska-Jorges & Jacobsson, 1995). 
Another feature of narrative construction is the hierarchical structuring of arguments. 
Drawing on the logic of anchoring practices (Swidler, 2001), the term anchoring narratives 
encapsulates the contentions and assumptions that provide the supporting logic that enables 
subordinate arguments to cohere into a fully-fledged storyline. This hierarchical relationship 
between anchoring and constituent narratives may have implications for narrative 
memberships where anchoring narratives form an important part of a group’s beliefs. For 
example, the assumption that carbon emissions are best controlled through carbon pricing 
may be crucial to economists or industry and may constitute anchoring narratives where they 
enable sub-narratives on policy instrument selection and/or design (Roe, 1994). The further 
importance of anchoring narratives stems from the potential to destabilise opposing 
narratives or encourage defections among opponents by targeting anchoring narratives. 
In addition to considering linkages between narrative construction and policy change, 
attention is needed to how the dynamics of policy change affect narrative competition. 
Howlett (2014) notes that major policy innovations are rare, sometimes because decision-
makers ignore developments that conflict with the status quo, and sometimes to avoid 
failures for which they can be held accountable (Schmidt, 2010). Risk management also 
encourages decision-makers to craft narratives to defend choices and where these become 
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institutionalised in key areas of government and society, advocates of change face uneven 
challenges in fashioning narratives to challenge the status quo (Bailey & Wilson, 2009).  
Radical shifts in narrative dominance and policy can occur, however, where gaps between 
policy and reality trigger ‘tectonic plate-like readjustments to existing policies’ (Howlett, 
2014: 397; Jacobs & Sobieraj, 2007). 
Drivers of change in narrative logic and balances of power between narratives can be broadly 
exogenous or endogenous, though the two often operate concurrently and in mutually 
constitutive ways: 
Exogenous change: originating outside the policy debate in question. These are difficult to 
categorise but Gillard (2016a) charts how government austerity in the UK was accompanied 
by discursive shifts in climate policy from narratives emphasising leadership and moral 
responsibility towards risk management and the justification of initiatives on the basis of co-
benefits rather than standalone climate benefits. Exogenous drivers may equally involve 
gradual changes or abrupt incidents, including elections and or actions by other countries. 
They may also undermine or strengthen dominant or competing narratives depending on 
which side assimilates the exogenous factor more successfully into its narrative logic, though 
again challenging narratives often require greater momentum to trigger change (Pemberton 
& Oliver, 2004). 
Endogenous change: in interests, influence, or storylines related to the policy being debated, 
encompassing changes in the narrative itself or in allegiances among influential groups that 
alter the power of incumbent and challenging narratives (Jones & McBeth, 2010). 
Endogenously-driven change commonly operates through the tactical co-optation of 
opponents’ narratives, where arguments are integrated into a counter-narrative (Jensen 
2012), or the debunking of adversaries’ anchoring narratives. 
Changes in narrative memberships can also have implications for narrative stability and policy 
change. Diverging interests within a group may trigger narrative defections and create new 
coalitions, particularly when highly influential actors decide their interests are better served 
elsewhere. For example, in 2010, the chief executive of BHP Billiton precipitated a shift in 
business and political debate on carbon pricing in Australia shortly after the government had 
abandoned proposals for carbon pricing by arguing that carbon pricing would promote 
Australian leadership in low-carbon investment (Bailey, MacGill, Passey & Compston, 2012). 
The impression so far is that narrative competition is predominantly adversarial and that 
change occurs mainly when one group outmanoeuvres rivals. However, compromise is central 
to NPA (Roe, 1994). Bailey & Compston (2012) discuss how trading political resources – such 
as adjusting emissions targets in exchange for industry cooperation – forms an important way 
of brokering compromises on contentious climate policies. Although resource exchange 
rather than narrative shift is the key variable in such situations, such strategies also rely on 
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industry groups communicating their new stance to encourage a recalibration of mainstream 
narratives (Weible, Sabatier & McQueen, 2009). 
Summing up, analysing how narratives influence debates on environmental issues offers 
numerous avenues for understanding policy change and strengthening connections between 
discourse and policy-change analysis. NPA has nevertheless drawn criticism for not 
establishing testable hypotheses (Sabatier, 2000), for focusing insufficiently on power, and 
for paying inadequate attention to subjectivities in the meanings ascribed to narratives by 
analysts (Roe, 1994). Space constraints prevent discussion of these points (but see Jones & 
McBeth (2010) for responses to this critique) except that NPA directly scrutinises how 
storylines project power and recognises that controversial issues involve basic disagreements 
over values, evidence or actions, both of which align with the ways politics is perceived and 
practiced by participants. Having sketched these ideas on how narratives influence policy 
change, we now explore the main narratives influencing New Zealand climate policy and how 
NPA might help identify opportunities for policy change. 
The NZ ETS 
The NZ ETS was legislated in 2008 as New Zealand’s flagship policy for achieving its Kyoto 
Protocol targets. Its supporters hailed it as the world’s first emissions trading scheme to 
encompass all economic sectors and Kyoto greenhouse gases (Bullock, 2012). However, the 
scheme was introduced shortly before Labour lost the 2008 election and the incoming 
coalition led by the National Party, which had opposed the legislation, introduced major 
reforms in 2009 and 2012 that critics argue removed much of its emissions-reduction 
potential. 
To understand these disputes, we first outline the main factors affecting the NZ ETS’s design. 
In 2014, New Zealand accounted for just 0.17% of global gross emissions, although its 
emissions-intensive primary industries and relatively high transport demand meant that in 
2015 (when the research was conducted) it ranked 21st globally for per-capita gross emissions 
(Ministry for the Environment, 2018a). New Zealand also has a distinctive emissions profile: 
81.9% of electricity came from renewables in 2017, while agriculture produced 48% of 
national emissions, mainly biological emissions by ruminant animals (Ministry for the 
Environment, 2019a). Mitigation challenges for New Zealand thus included further reducing 
energy emissions given the high level of renewables, addressing transport emissions and 
reducing agricultural emissions without harming the sector’s international competitiveness 
or producing emissions leakage overseas (Leining and Kerr, 2018). 
Reflecting these issues, the NZ ETS was designed without a domestic emissions cap and 
instead operated within the global cap created by the Kyoto Protocol (New Zealand 
Government 2007). Instead of constraining domestic emissions through caps, the intention 
was that pricing emissions would incentivise abatement across the economy where 
abatement was cost-effective within a scheme that requires targeted sectors to surrender 
units to cover their actual emissions from prescribed activities (Leining & Kerr, 2018). In the 
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2008 legislation, the total allowances allocated freely to each sector was fixed and 
participants surrendered one allowance per tonne of CO2-equivalent emitted (Jackson 
Inderberg, Bailey & Harmer, 2017). Owners of forests planted before 1990 carried unit 
liabilities for deforestation, while post-1989 forest owners could opt to receive units for 
removals in return for accepting future liability for reversals. Another provision permitted 
sectors to cover emissions by buying unlimited eligible overseas Kyoto units to help manage 
costs. However, this was criticised for exposing the scheme to low international prices and 
linking to the Kyoto market was discontinued in 2015 following the government’s decision to 
take New Zealand’s 2013-2020 emissions reduction commitment under the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) rather than the Kyoto Protocol (Leining 
& Kerr, 2018). The 2008 legislation also planned progressive phasing-in of forestry (2008), 
liquid fossil fuels (2009), stationary energy and industrial processes (2010), and agriculture 
and waste (2013). 
In 2009, the new government established a series of transitional arrangements that included: 
delaying entry of some sectors (notably agriculture); allowing stationary energy, transport 
and industrial processes to surrender one NZU for every two tonnes of CO2-equivalent; 
output-based free allocation for emissions-intensive and trade-exposed producers; and a 
ceiling price for units of NZD25 to protect competitiveness (Bullock, 2012). The 2012 revision 
introduced fewer changes but extended the transitional moderation measures indefinitely, 
contrary to recommendations by the Emission Trading Scheme Review Panel (2011). In 2016, 
the government decided to phase out the ‘two-for-one’ obligation in non-forestry sectors by 
2019 and announced in-principle decisions to reform the architecture of the NZ ETS to make 
it fit for purpose under the Paris Agreement. In 2017, the New Labour-led government 
signalled its intention to reform the NZ ETS in line with increasing New Zealand’s domestic 
mitigation goals (Ministry for the Environment, 2018b). We discuss more recent 
announcements later in the article. 
Research approach 
The analysis consisted of mapping the main narratives used to portray the NZ ETS, to identify 
their assumptions, plot and temporal elements, characters, and policy solutions and enable 
recording of narrative disputes, anchoring narratives, and potential points of accommodation 
(Stone, 2002). Establishing these narratives inevitably involved aggregating subsidiary 
narratives identified during the research (Czarniawska, 2004). However, the two main 
narratives identified captured the chief areas of contestation when the research was 
conducted in 2015. Further analysis linked stakeholders to narratives while recognising the 
potential for groups or individuals to subscribe to different narratives simultaneously, attach 
differing importance to individual arguments, and switch allegiances. Although the narratives 
reflected relatively stable interests and attitudes among protagonists at the time, such 
variations mean that NPA invariably entails some stylisation of viewpoints to maintain 
narrative clarity. 
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The data consisted of secondary documents and 23 expert interviews with representatives 
from New Zealand’s main political parties, government departments, businesses, NGOs and 
independent analysts (Table 1). Interviewees were selected using expertise mapping from 
documentary sources complemented by interviewee recommendations. Efforts were made 
to cover all opinions identified in the secondary analysis, though limited detailed knowledge 
of the political processes accompanying the design of the ETS among NGO representatives 
was compensated by recruiting independent analysts with expertise in the scheme. The 
interviews included questions on the design and changes to the ETS, the main actors involved, 
and the political processes accompanying its development. Transcribed interviews were sent 
to interviewees for approval.   
TABLES 1 and 2 
The secondary analysis utilised official reports, party, cabinet and parliamentary papers, 
public reports and independent academic analyses (Table 2). Stakeholder documents yielded 
most sources because the design and reviews of the NZ ETS involved input from several multi-
stakeholder groups that operated during these processes, including the Climate Change 
Leadership Forum and other advisory groups. Company and sector-association analyses were 
also scrutinised, using content analysis to identify themes corresponding with the main NPA 
components identified above, while data triangulation and discussion within the research 
team were used to interpret each narrative. 
New Zealand climate narratives 
Two main narratives around the actions New Zealand should take on climate change emerged 
from the analysis. Before reviewing these, it should be restressed that both narratives 
contained variations in the logics and arguments employed, the emphases placed on 
arguments, and the motivations underpinning actors’ standpoints. Two broad classifications 
of preferred policy approach could nevertheless be identified. The Global Emissions Narrative 
contended that the NZ ETS was achieving its objectives provided it met its international 
responsibility target, even if domestic emissions rose, and that New Zealand was making a 
fair contribution to global mitigation relative to its size and economic circumstances. The 
Domestic Efforts Narrative argued that stronger action was needed to reduce domestic 
emissions and rejected the suggestion that New Zealand was too small to contribute to 
tackling climate change. Although these ‘compound narratives’ involved some conflation of 
arguments and views, the following section also explores commonalities and divergences 
within and between narratives to assist in investigating opportunities for narrative shifts and 
policy change. 
Global Efforts Narrative (GEN) 
The GEN has historically dominated debates on the NZ ETS, and although aspects of its 
approach were criticised by Labour and Green Party politicians, activist groups and many 
independent analysts, many of its contentions were shared by representatives from business 
and centre-right political parties, including the National Party, New Zealand First, and ACT 
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New Zealand. Aspects of the narrative were also expressed by some members of the public 
administration, particularly the Treasury and Ministry for Primary Industries, but also by some 
in the Ministry for Environment and some academics and forestry representatives. The GEN 
accepted anthropogenic climate change but argued that policy should focus on reducing 
emissions at least cost globally rather than forcing countries with high efficiency and 
mitigation costs to shoulder unaffordable burdens. Accordingly, the view was that developed-
country targets should reflect national circumstances but give flexibility to allow least-cost 
compliance by meeting part of targets through the Kyoto flexibility mechanisms and ETS 
linking. Cost effectiveness thus formed the GEN’s first anchoring argument, but another 
contention to justify avoiding adopting ‘reckless’ targets (industry representative) was that 
New Zealand is too small to influence climate change through its actions. An appropriate 
contribution to global mitigation by New Zealand thus consisted of participation in 
international negotiations, pricing carbon to incentivise domestic abatement where New 
Zealand possesses cost advantages, and purchasing international allowances. 
Another anchoring narrative in the GEN was the need for economic safeguards because of: 
limited options for low-cost abatement in stationary energy and transport; technical and 
economic barriers to reducing biological agricultural emissions; and trade exposure among 
key sectors, including agriculture (Pastoral Greenhouse Gas Research Consortium, 2014). 
Several interviewees argued that New Zealand is a ‘price-taker’ on international markets, so 
pricing biological agricultural emissions would damage the sector’s competitiveness unless 
other countries introduced similar measures. Economic arguments were further legitimated 
by assertions about carbon leakage: ‘If agricultural activities move overseas to reduce 
emissions, this makes New Zealand poorer but makes no difference to global emissions 
because they simply occur elsewhere… Taking sheep off the land just devalues an 
economically efficient activity’ (agriculture representative). However, interviews also 
revealed interest-led differences of opinion. Meat producers claimed they had fewer 
mitigation options than dairying, where controls could be created for slurry and feedstuffs, 
whereas reducing emissions from extensive grazing necessitated de-stocking. Both sectors 
nevertheless emphasised efficiency gains per unit of product (‘the beef and lamb sectors’ 
emissions are 17% lower in 2015 than in 1990 for similar production’ (industry 
representative)), leading to suggestions that New Zealand should actually contribute to 
reducing global emissions by increasing its emissions-efficient agricultural exports. 
GEN exponents used such reasoning to stress the NZ ETS’s suitability for New Zealand’s 
circumstances and making a fair contribution to international emissions reduction. One 
official argued: ‘the policy has performed as intended… it has enabled New Zealand to meet 
its targets at least cost.’ Similarly, an independent analyst stressed: ‘we were the first to try 
an all-sectors, all-gases approach and proved it can be done, although agriculture has never 
moved into implementation’, while another official highlighted the cost-effectiveness of 
forestry offsets: ‘Forests were important, and they are a manifestly different proposition from 
anything Europe was trying to achieve… the EU limits on offsets were not in line with the goals 
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of the NZ ETS.’ One industry representative likened the ETS to a machine, claiming the critical 
element was its legal structure because ‘the machine has the right cogs but the dials are 
turned down. Labour set the dials to three, but National turned them to one and zero for 
agriculture… [but] this made it politically acceptable’. 
Another subsidiary aspect of the GEN mentioned by interviewees for managing administrative 
costs was a preference for streamlined regulation, including self-reporting of emissions with 
the threat of audit (similar to the New Zealand tax system) and placing the point of obligation 
as far upstream in the supply chain as possible so that most businesses are not required to 
participate in the ETS (Leining and Kerr, 2018). Interviewees related this to neoliberal 
traditions created during the ‘Rogernomics’ economic reforms in the 1980s, which have 
propagated an ethos of light-touch, market-led regulation. An ETS (especially without limits 
on importing international units) was consistent with the view that market forces, not 
government, should decide where emissions reductions should occur. Allied to this was a 
belief that NZ ETS prices would incentivise action across the economy. As one official noted, 
‘the ETS is the main instrument for achieving New Zealand’s target, so there is less inclination 
to have complementary measures (e.g. renewable energy targets) for reasons of double 
regulation.’ Experts argued that the ETS had familiarised companies with incorporating 
carbon prices into business models and stressed the importance of testing the ETS’s 
functioning while retaining the option to strengthen settings if economic and political 
circumstances allowed. 
Economic considerations also dominated the GEN’s temporal focus; interviewees stressed 
that overemphasising domestic emissions reduction would cause immediate damage to New 
Zealand’s primary industries. Another temporal element highlighted the short lifespan of 
methane. As one industry representative argued, ‘UNFCCC rules treat methane as 25 times 
more potent than CO2 but if herd sizes remain constant, there is a constant atmospheric stock 
of methane because of its rapid breakdown.’ He further contended that methane is 
discriminated against compared with forestry offsets because tree-carbon returns to the 
atmosphere with decomposition. This is incorrect because methane and other greenhouse 
gases are treated comparably under the scheme (Parliamentary Commissioner for the 
Environment, 2019). Additionally, modelling by the New Zealand Agricultural Greenhouse Gas 
Research Centre (NZAGGRC) indicates that biogenic emissions need to be reduced by 10-22% 
below 2016 levels by 2050 and 20-27% by 2100 to ensure methane from New Zealand 
livestock causes no additional contribution to climate change beyond that at 2016 levels 
(Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment, 2018). The use of temporal ‘stocks-and-
flows’ arguments to defend excluding biogenic emissions nevertheless illustrates the selective 
use of evidence to support narrative arguments. 
‘Villain and victim’ arguments expressed by GEN supporters often focused on discrimination 
against rural communities, reemphasising farmers’ exposure to higher production costs from 
pricing of biological emissions (Cooper & Rosin, 2014), and competitive risks to emissions-
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intensive, trade-exposed industries. One agricultural interviewee added ‘why should we be 
taxed before anybody else acts and if we don’t have meaningful alternatives. This comes from 
city-dwelling greenies who want to feel good.’ Accusations of indifference were also directed 
by agricultural and industry interviewees at economists who prioritised rapid emissions 
reduction over livelihoods: ‘Their answer is to change land use, in effect destroy export 
revenue and livelihoods’. Correspondingly, the narrative’s villains were ‘city-dwelling 
greenies’ represented by the Green Party, Labour factions, and dogmatic academics. The main 
heroes were farmers, who formed the backbone of New Zealand’s low-emissions agricultural 
sector. Forest owners were also portrayed as heroes for providing low-cost credits, while 
victims were also farmers and industrial producers whose trade exposure merited protection 
from unfair regulation, and taxpayers who would pay more for goods under a stronger ETS. 
The GEN’s preferred approach was to strengthen the ETS only where there was conclusive 
evidence this would not damage important economic sectors. New Zealand had 
demonstrated its commitment to international efforts by accepting emissions targets but 
could not solve climate change, so strong domestic action was senseless and economically 
irresponsible. Focusing on low-cost domestic and international abatement was prudent and 
fair, and stronger measures were only acceptable if other countries introduced comparable 
requirements to ensure a level playing field. 
Domestic Efforts Narrative (DEN) 
The main arguments underpinning the DEN were that design flaws impeded the NZ ETS from 
producing meaningful emissions reductions, and that New Zealand – a wealthy and high per-
capita emitting country with major endowments in renewable energy and flexible land-use – 
lacked a credible climate-change strategy (Bertram & Terry, 2010). According to this narrative, 
the ETS gives the impression of action while protecting business-as-usual and creating future 
climate and economic risks. Views among its supporters ranged from criticism of the scheme’s 
management to outright cynicism towards the ETS. One industry representative claimed, ‘the 
ETS’ objectives have not been achieved. It’s supposed to drive a low-carbon economy, not 
just low-cost abatement’, while an academic argued, ‘The NZ ETS has important weaknesses. 
A carbon tax is easier to defend if ministers and officials are minded. The ETS is so complicated 
and expert-driven that it undermines the democratic mandate.’ 
Another recurring theme was disbelief that international allowances produced credible 
emissions cuts. Accordingly, it stressed the need for domestic abatement: ‘How does buying 
Ukrainian ‘hot air’ help the climate?’ (politician). Similarly, interviewees criticised the 
scheme’s approach to emissions limits and allocations. One industry interviewee noted, ‘They 
called it cap-and-trade; now they just call it emissions trading. Leaving the domestic cap out 
is the biggest mistake.’ Those more supportive of the Kyoto cap lamented the government’s 
decision not to ratify Kyoto II: ‘People said ‘you don’t have a cap’; we had the Kyoto cap until 
we lost that’ (independent expert). Others accused the government of double standards: ‘We 
ratified Kyoto then opted out of period two, but still want to use its allowances’ (politician). 
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‘It’s a question of making a proportionate effort reflecting the country’s capabilities, but the 
government will have a hard job selling the New Zealand target to the UNFCCC because it’s 
done nothing’ (industry representative). ‘The politicians always start off talking about cost 
and design the scheme from there. A discussion about defining New Zealand’s fair share is 
where you must start… then analyse what’s economically feasible’ (politician). 
Some DEN advocates also maintained that more units should be auctioned to increase 
incentives and that allocations should be based on absolute emissions, not emissions 
intensity, because production increases may outstrip efficiency gains. Others, reflecting the 
scope for variation within narratives, supported output-based free allocation where genuine 
concerns existed about economic impacts or carbon leakage. DEN supporters were also 
scornful of allowing sectors to submit one NZU for every two tonnes of emissions and 
exempting biological agricultural emissions. Alongside pressing for action on a major 
emissions source, the DEN argued that ‘agriculture needs to stop treating dairy as a 
speculative commodity with everything based on short-termism, and start thinking about the 
benefits of sustainable farming for water, carbon, biodiversity and recreation’ (independent 
commentator). 
The DEN’s main temporal element centred on the need for stronger policies by New Zealand 
and other countries to prevent an imminent climate crisis. Another emphasised the 
competitiveness and innovation benefits of decarbonisation as other countries adopted low-
carbon technologies and consumption. Procrastination was likely to exacerbate future 
economic risks because carbon prices would need to increase more rapidly and New Zealand 
may suffer reduced demand for its goods and services unless it embraced the low-carbon 
agenda. Another aspect utilised historical comparisons. One independent commentator 
noted that, ‘Industry’s attitude is that the ETS adds costs, especially in export markets. But 
New Zealand has seen unprecedented exchange-rate rises. Did this cause mass bankruptcy? 
No, and neither have other price fluctuations. Businesses have adapted. It’s interesting how 
modest carbon prices induce paranoia but other price variations are accepted.’ 
Key villains in the DEN were agriculture, particularly dairying and industrial free-allocation 
recipients, for avoiding emissions and other environmental responsibilities. Fonterra, New 
Zealand’s main dairying cooperative, was singled out by one expert: ‘Fonterra’s lobbying 
behaviour is based on being the country’s largest exporter and its capacity to press trade 
exposure.’ Some consultancies were regarded as both heroes and villains. The New Zealand 
Institute of Economic Research (NZIER) and Business and Economic Research Limited (BERL) 
were seen as belonging to opposing camps and having uneven influence: ‘NZIER was more 
pessimistic about the ETS’s economic impacts… Treasury called both to discuss their 
modelling… BERL won on virtually every point, but policy was informed more by NZIER 
modelling… The big polluters got 90% of their obligations paid for by taxpayers’ (independent 
commentator). 
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The National Party was frequently portrayed as lacking the political courage to tighten the NZ 
ETS. One commentator noted that, ‘the global financial crisis was used as a smokescreen for 
the fact that National was heavily populated by climate sceptics and there was no serious 
commitment to tackling the issue. I have my doubts whether the current climate minister 
believes in climate change,’ and ‘National completely gutted the ETS’ (politician). Some 
academics argued that differences between the major parties were largely rhetorical, but 
regarded ACT and NZ First as villains for working against regulation and only recently 
acknowledging human-induced climate change. The DEN’s heroes were green activists, the 
Green Party, parts of the Labour Party, academics who criticised the scheme, and companies 
involved in low-carbon innovation. Some Labour ministers who legislated the NZ ETS were 
even regarded as visionaries who had been thwarted by business and the National Party. 
Victims, meanwhile, were the New Zealand public, whose quality of life was threatened by 
short-sighted policies. Sympathy was also expressed for foresters because of financial risks 
created by the scheme.  
Two main solutions were proposed under the DEN. Reformists felt the NZ ETS could form part 
of New Zealand’s climate strategy provided its flaws were addressed and complementary 
policies were introduced, particularly for renewable energy and electric vehicles. This view 
was commonest among experts who had advised the government: ‘There is scope to use the 
ETS to tighten action on climate change but it requires a change in mind-sets’ (independent 
commentator). Other reforms included limiting or prohibiting international allowances; 
ending the ‘two-for-one’ scheme; changing the basis for free allocations; absolute emissions 
allocations; auctioning; removing the price ceiling; and adding a price floor. The alternative 
solution was revisiting proposals for a carbon tax, which had been rejected in 2005: ‘even 
with amendments to the ETS, I’m still uncertain about supporting it’ (politician). 
TABLE 3 
 
Discussion: Narrative analysis and policy change 
Analysis of the main New Zealand climate-policy narratives (Table 3 summarises their main 
arguments) revealed strong polarisation and, at the time, few interviewees saw much scope 
for compromise. However, significant narrative and policy shifts began during 2018, when the 
Labour-led government initiated consultations on its Climate Change Response (Zero Carbon) 
Amendment Bill, which was introduced to Parliament in May 2019. The main measures in the 
bill include: 
 An independent Climate Change Commission to provide advice and monitoring to 
keep governments on track towards long-term climate goals; 
 Net zero greenhouse-gas emissions by New Zealand by 2050 with the exception of 
biogenic methane, where alternative targets were proposed to reduce gross emissions 
by 10% from 2017 levels by 2030 and by 24-47% by 2050; 
14 
 
 Emissions budgets to provide stepping-stones towards the 2050 target (Parliamentary 
Counsel Office, 2019). 
In 2018 and 2019, the government also announced reforms to the scheme, including a 
framework to enable capping of New Zealand’s ETS emissions to restrict the supply of units 
and increase incentives to reduce emissions. Auctioning is also planned to align the supply of 
units with New Zealand’s emissions targets, while a cost containment reserve allowing units 
to be auctioned when a predetermined market price is reached is scheduled to replace the 
$25 price ceiling when auctioning is introduced (anticipated in 2020). Another change 
provides for limits on the number of international units allowed into the scheme and 
regulations to ensure their integrity. Accessing international units will additionally be 
conditional on progress towards New Zealand’s emissions target, adequate incentives for 
domestic abatement, and sound economic justifications for accessing international units 
(Ministry for the Environment, 2019b). 
Other changes seek to improve transparency and compliance by publishing emissions and 
removals data for individual participants and automatic penalties of three times the market 
price for participants that fail to surrender or repay units by their due date, with further 
penalties where enforcement agencies need to amend emissions returns or assessments, or 
where participants knowingly misreport emissions. Finally, the government announced 
measures: to enable appointment of an independent auction monitor to promote fair 
auctions and competitive price formation; removal of the price ceiling no later than 31 
December 2022 if auctioning is delayed; enablement of a price floor if desired in the future; 
and establishment of a programme to advise on options for market governance (Ministry for 
the Environment, 2019b). 
The remainder of this section now re-examines the GEN and DEN, utilising our earlier 
discussion and primary data in conjunction with recent developments to explore ongoing and 
potential processes of narrative and policy change in New Zealand climate policy. 
We begin with the effects of exogenous events. During the research, one interviewee 
identified shifts in public or institutional opinions (particularly within Treasury), and a new 
international climate agreement as possible ‘game-changing’ events. Although the causal 
impact of exogenous events is difficult to establish, the Paris Agreement and the 2017 election 
appear to have prompted a sea change in New Zealand climate policy. The Zero Carbon Bill 
makes direct reference to developing ‘clear and stable climate policies that contribute that 
contribute to the global effort under the Paris Agreement to limit the global average 
temperature increase to 1.5° Celsius above pre-industrial levels’ (Parliamentary Counsel 
Office, 2019). The consultation conducted prior to the bill’s introduction already indicated 
broad support for its measures (Ministry for the Environment, 2018c), while the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2018) 1.5°C report published in October 2018 
also propelled public support for greater domestic action (personal communication). The 
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evidence therefore suggests that focusing events can produce narrative shifts and improve 
conditions for policy change. 
The next option involved undermining opponents’ anchoring narratives to encourage 
narrative or coalition defection. Space constraints restrict this discussion mainly to 
vulnerabilities within the GEN, though weaknesses in the DEN and possibilities for its 
arguments to gain ground are also considered. The GEN’s anchoring narratives can be recalled 
as follows: 
 Climate change is an important issue but strong action to reduce domestic emissions 
would jeopardise New Zealand’s trade-exposed economy and have negligible effects 
on global emissions; 
 The electricity sector’s low carbon footprint and difficulties reducing biological 
agricultural emissions without reducing production limit the options for low-cost 
domestic emissions reductions; 
 A market mechanism with international linkages is the most cost-effective way of 
contributing to global emissions reductions. 
The key elements of the DEN were: 
 Climate change is an imminent threat to New Zealand and other countries; 
 New Zealand is a wealthy and high per-capita emitting country with a moral 
responsibility to reduce domestic emissions;  
 The country has considerable capacity to reduce net emissions in areas like renewable 
energy, transport, and land management; 
 The NZ ETS does not incentivise domestic emissions reduction and requires substantial 
reform of emissions caps, allocation mechanisms, and price management. 
Although each anchoring narrative had its detractors, most interviewees agreed that New 
Zealand climate policy must reflect the country’s trade exposure and emissions profile, and 
there was near-universal support for carbon pricing, if not the ETS. This suggests difficulties 
in attacking anchoring narratives that reflect widely-held societal concerns. That said, 
targeting weaker elements of anchoring narratives may shift the equilibrium of debates, 
especially if counter-narratives resonate with other social beliefs. For example, Labour’s 2017 
election manifesto challenged the portrayal of New Zealand as an insignificant player on 
climate change: ‘It is not good enough to say we are too small to matter – most countries 
individually could claim the same’ (Labour, 2017). In so doing, Labour invoked alternative 
imaginaries of New Zealand as a resourceful and responsible country that ‘punches above its 
weight’ to challenge the GEN’s representation of New Zealand as disempowered by its 
economic vulnerabilities (Driver, Parsons & Fisher, 2018). 
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The difficulties of challenging established narratives equally draws attention to exploring how 
incremental narrative shifts and ‘bridging’ narratives might lessen polarisation, especially 
where governing institutions already acknowledge gaps between policy rhetoric and reality 
(Howlett, 2014). One reason for the agriculture sector’s reluctance to include biogenic 
emissions in the ETS was that the government’s preference for processor-level obligations 
inhibited individual farms from benefitting from farm-level initiatives to control emissions or 
convert land-uses (Cooper & Rosin, 2014). Relaxing this requirement, by providing grants for 
verified types of abatement or offset schemes might enhance the sector’s contribution to 
mitigation while remaining consistent with narratives stressing cost-effective action. Several 
interviewees speculated that this could also encourage wider coalition shifts if actors like 
Fonterra were persuaded to champion agriculture’s participation. Stressing other issues like 
the water-quality benefits of reducing effluent discharges might also reinforce support for 
including biogenic emissions. Bridging narratives can, however, create new controversies. 
Sectors with mandatory obligations could complain about favouritism towards farmers, while 
converting land uses through small-scale forestry projects may clash with GEN concerns about 
carbon leakage. The example nonetheless demonstrates how marginal narrative shifts might 
precipitate larger changes in climate policy debates and illustrates the importance of 
narrative diplomacy, where opponents’ arguments are recognised and renegotiated to reach 
shared interpretations of how to address problems rather than just seeking to invalidate them 
(Miskimmon, O’Loughlin & Roselle, 2014). 
Another option involves identifying where differences in interests and arguments within 
narrative alliances might encourage coalition changes (Heikkila, Weible & Pierce, 2014). One 
example concerns disputes between dairy and meat producers on emissions baselines. Meat 
producers claimed they would consider entering the NZ ETS if 1990 baseline emissions were 
adopted because they would receive credit for improved efficiency through the presumed 
free allocation regime. However, dairying wanted later baselines because higher production 
since 1990 meant the sector would lose under absolute emissions measures and still face 
pressure under intensity-based measures, despite reducing biological emissions by 20% per 
unit of production since 1990 (Eggleton, 2017). ‘Absolute free allocation’ refers to distributing 
allowances on the basis of greenhouse gases emitted using historical emissions. ‘Intensity-
based free allocation’ refers to emission units distributed as a proportion of production, 
factoring in emissions efficiency. This issue has caused intra-group frictions, as one industry 
representative explained: ‘the feeling was that government listen more if we speak with a 
collective voice. However, when dairy talks about unity, they often mean other sectors should 
agree with them.’ Although most agriculturalists drew on trade-exposure narratives, interest 
differences indicate some potential to disrupt this coalition by offering selective policy 
concessions. Again, however, coalition-splitting tactics may backfire if they fuel new 
narratives of unjust treatment for some New Zealand’s farmers). 
Another way of utilising NPA is to investigate marginalised storylines. One illustration was the 
limited attention given by interviewees to the economic and social consequences of climate 
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change for New Zealand. Although the GEN and DEN both acknowledge climate change as an 
important issue, and numerous impact assessments have been conducted (Ministry for the 
Environment, 2016), debates on the NZ ETS appeared to be dominated by technicalities and 
the cost implications of action rather than inaction. Christoff (2013) similarly notes how 
discourses emphasising weak valuations of environmental costs have diminished the 
influence of scientific and ethical discourses on climate policy in Australia. Although 
reinjecting climate-impact storylines might counteract preoccupation with the economic 
dimensions of climate policy, gaining traction may require coalitions of actors spanning 
perceived heroes, victims and villains, including economic actors like insurers and major 
agricultural companies, engaging in active discussion of the risks from climate change (Richter 
& Chambers, 2014). 
A key device used by the government to reframe the climate debate has been the Zero Carbon 
Bill consultation conducted in 2018. The accompanying discussion document provided 
impetus for this reframing by presenting the government’s proposals on long-term targets, 
domestic action and agriculture as critical to a planned low-carbon transition and New 
Zealand’s economic, social and environmental well-being. This was supported by economic 
modelling which, the government argued, showed only modest economic effects provided 
measures were introduced to promote investment in innovation, new forestation and 
protection for poorer households. This was despite wide variations in average emissions 
prices for the period 2018-2050 resulting from differences in the coverage of the two models 
used and different innovation scenarios (Ministry for the Environment, 2018d). 
The 2018 consultation revealed 67% support for an immediate 2050 target, 58% support for 
net zero emissions across all greenhouse gases by 2050, and 60% support for meeting targets 
only from domestic actions (Ministry for the Environment, 2018c). Despite this, the Zero 
Carbon Bill has still drawn criticism from Greenpeace for the ‘miserly’ 10% cut in methane by 
2030, and the National Party which, despite supporting the bill’s first reading, argued that 
methane targets should be decided by the Climate Commission (McLachlan, 2019). The 
consultation thus highlights both the difficulties in gaining consensus in polarised debates and 
the imperative of securing legitimation for new narratives prior to attempting major policy 
change. 
 
Conclusion 
One of discourse analysis’ main contributions to environmental politics has been in deepening 
understandings of the power effects created by, and built into, discourse (Feindt and Oels, 
2006). However, progress remains slower in providing clarity on how discursive processes 
translate into changes in institutional preferences and policy (Lorenzoni & Benson, 2014; 
Gillard, 2016a), and in counteracting the tendency for discourses analyses to critique existing 
power relations without directing similar energy towards exploring how language studies 
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might also contribute towards addressing political disputes on issues like climate change 
(Breeze, 2011). 
This article contributes to addressing these concerns by examining how narrative policy 
analysis can be utilised to understand and mediate climate-policy disputes, based on analysis 
of the New Zealand emissions trading scheme. The evidence indicates that NPA offers 
considerable promise in illuminating the causes of conflict and opportunities for reducing 
policy polarisation by distinguishing the components of competing arguments, how narrative 
elements interrelate and use anchoring narratives to cohere storylines, the presence or 
absence of themes in narratives, and how combatants position themselves in relation to 
narrative components (Fløttum & Gjerstad, 2017). 
In so doing, the study provides a number of broader insights into how NPA can be used to 
address polarisation in climate policy. First, it highlights the obstacles to achieving decisive 
victories in entrenched debates. Although actors seeking policy change might seek to 
destabilise opponents’ policies by attacking anchoring narratives, this is likely to prompt stern 
resistance from state and non-government actors who see existing policies as effective in 
achieving their desired goals, while counter-narratives equally acquire prominence by 
offering plausible alternatives. Building on this, the second main lesson concerns the value of 
gradually transforming prevailing narratives to enable greater policy experimentation 
(Pemberton & Oliver, 2004).  Focusing on accommodative and incremental approaches, 
including using bridging narratives to broker agreements, may not only prove more 
productive in reducing polarisation than approaches that seek narrative capitulation but may 
also precipitate more extensive change where subtler changes in narrative emphasis engineer 
space for larger shifts in actor standpoints. 
Third, how individual actors’ interests affect narrative allegiances may offer further avenues 
for encouraging change within dominant coalitions. Combative approaches might seek to 
erode coalitions by offering selective concessions to some actors, whereas less provocative 
tactics involve negotiating with leading coalition actors to encourage them to socialise new 
norms among their peers. Finally, analysing neglected issues may substantially alter the 
equilibrium of narrative contests. Absent discussions may indicate areas of agreement, topics 
protagonists feel uncomfortable broaching, or it may indicate where actors have become 
locked into certain discussions (Bailey & Wilson 2009), and where restressing overlooked 
storylines – like New Zealand’s climate vulnerabilities or opportunities for innovation – may 
stimulate creative approaches to dispute resolution. 
Drawing on these insights, NPA could provide important assistance in other countries where 
climate policy has become polarised. In Australia, climate policy remains significantly 
cramped by long-running disputes over the economic and social effects of carbon pricing 
(Bailey et al., 2012), while addressing the ongoing hiatus in United States federal climate 
policy is made doubly important by its influence on other countries’ willingness to act with 
greater urgency on climate change (Harris, 2013). When applying lessons from New Zealand’s 
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climate-policy experiences, the importance of power and popular support in underwriting 
narrative and policy shifts must nevertheless be emphasised. It seems unlikely that New 
Zealand climate policy would have undergone such a radical shift after the Paris Agreement 
without the election of a new government and the Zero Carbon Bill consultation, but even 
then, the government needed to legitimate its narratives before attempting major policy 
change. It should also be remembered that NPA offers a methodological approach for 
scrutinising individual political disputes whose essential orientation is less towards high 
theory than towards changing policy records one track at a time. 
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Table 1: Interviews by sector 
Sector No. of interviewees 
Politicians 5 
Departmental officials 4 
Industry representatives 6 
Independent experts 5 
Academics 3 
Total 23 
 
 
Table 2: Documentary sources 
Classification No. of documents 
Government publications and documents 48 
Parliamentary records 25 
Stakeholder groups 109 
Independent analysts 36 
Academic publications 22 
Total  240 
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Table 3: Main elements of the NZ ETS narratives 
Issue Domestic Efforts International Action 
Membership 
 
Greens, Labour, ENGOs, many academics, 
foresters 
National, ACT, NZ First, trade- exposed industry, farmers, some 
academics 
Trust in the ETS Low trust in the ETS or its current 
calibration 
Trust in the ETS because it achieves government goals 
Kyoto Protocol NZ applies double standards by not joining 
Kyoto II while using its rules 
Kyoto rules are recognised internationally and NZ contributes 
effectively to global net emissions reduction 
Domestic emissions domestic emissions must be reduced; the 
economy should restructure 
NZ emissions can rise provided it contributes fairly to reductions 
in global net emissions. NZ has an emissions-efficient economy 
ETS performance Does not reduce emissions and only gives 
the appearance of action 
Works as intended. Sectors accept a carbon price that does not 
hinder competitiveness and it is influencing behaviour  
International linking Linking weakens incentives for domestic 
emissions reduction 
International links are vital for achieving targets, reducing global 
emissions, and maintaining cost effectiveness 
Trade-exposure Trade exposure does not justify domestic 
inaction. NZ economy needs to decarbonise 
to retain long-term competitiveness and 
green image 
NZ industry is trade exposed and needs safeguards; emphasis 
must be on cost-effective global abatement 
International 
allowances  
Unreliable and should be avoided or strictly 
regulated 
NZ should contribute to global abatement by using international 
allowances. Regulation secures allowance integrity 
Allocation methods Auctioning based on absolute emissions; no 
free allowances. 
Intensity-based allocations do not constrain growth or place 
excessive costs on business 
 
